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Unnecessary Burdens to
Post-Conviction DNA Testing:
New Mexico's Post-Conviction DNA Relief Statute
and Suggestions for Improvement
saMantha catalano*
Abstract: Post-conviction DNA testing is often the last option a convicted
person may have to establish that they are not guilty of a crime. New Mexico's post-conviction DNA statute requires convicted persons who seek
DNA testing to claim innocence and establish that the identity of the perpetrator was an issue at trial. These requirements are currently included
in many state post-conviction DNA statutes; however, some states have
amended their statutes to remove these unnecessary requirements. Convicted persons who claimed self-defense, or another affirmative defense
may be denied post-conviction DNA testing because of inability to claim
"innocence" and because the identity of the perpetrator may not have
been an issue at trial. This Article argues that New Mexico's post-conviction DNA statute should be amended to remove these requirements,
as they are unnecessarily burdensome and can prevent exonerations of
"no crime" wrongfully convicted persons. This Article first discusses how
post-conviction DNA testing may be used to exonerate wrongfully convicted persons. Second, it provides an analysis of post-conviction DNA
testing statutes and their application in jurisdictions outside of New
Mexico. Third, it discusses New Mexico's current post-conviction DNA
statute and proposes amendments. Finally, it addresses potential concerns to lessening the burden on access to post-conviction DNA testing.
Keywords: Wrongful Convictions; Conviction DNA; Post-conviction
Statute; No-crime Wrongful Conviction; New Mexico's Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute.
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1. Introduction
On June 15, 2012, Gregory Marvin Hobbs got into a physical altercation with Ruben Archuleta, Jr. and Ruben Archuleta, Sr.1 During
this close physical altercation, Gregory Hobbs shot and killed both his
opponents2. The state, on the one hand, determined that the shooting
of Ruben Archuleta, Jr. was legally justifiable; on the other, it charged
Gregory Hobbs with voluntary manslaughter for the shooting of
Ruben Archuleta, Sr.3
Gregory Hobbs maintains that he shot Ruben Archuleta, Sr., in
self-defense4. He described that after the shooting of Archuleta, Jr.,
Archuleta, Sr. grabbed for the gun in Hobbs' hand, attempting to
shoot Hobbs5. Hobbs tried to back up and get away, but Archuleta,
Sr. grabbed him once again The two men struggled over the gun, and
Hobbs stated that he was in fear for his life when he fired the gun and
shot Archuleta, Sr.6
* Samantha Catalano is a rising third-year law student at The University of New
Mexico School of Law in Albuquerque, New Mexico. She received her Bachelor of
Science from New Mexico State University in Cell Biology, and studied Neuroscience at Allegheny College in Meadville, Pennsylvania
1. See State v. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44, para. 2, cert. granted (Sept. 8, 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at para. 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Two separate eyewitnesses to the shooting, including Archuleta,
Jr.'s wife Teresa, testified that Hobbs and Archuleta, Sr. had been
wrestling before the gun went off7. One of the witnesses corroborated
Hobbs' version of events by testifying that it appeared Archuleta, Sr.
was trying to get the gun from Hobbs before being shot8. At trial, the
state argued that the evidence did not support Hobbs' description of
events9. Despite being given an instruction on Hobbs' theory of selfdefense10, the jury rejected Hobbs' theory, and convicted him of voluntary manslaughter11. Hobbs was consequently sentenced to seven
years in prison for the death of Ruben Archuleta, Sr.12
At trial, no forensic testing (including DNA testing) was ordered
by the state or by Roswell's Police Department13. It is unclear why
DNA testing of the evidence obtained pre-trial was not tested at the
time of trial. In 2015, Hobbs petitioned the 5th Judicial District Court
for post-conviction DNA testing of the gun used in the shooting and
of the t-shirt Hobbs wore at that time14. Although the statutory requirements within New Mexico's post-conviction DNA relief statute
would have seemed to prevent Hobbs from obtaining DNA testing15,
the state did not oppose Hobbs' motion, and the petition was granted16.
In Hobbs' case, the testing resulted in finding of Ruben Archuleta,
Sr.'s DNA on the ejection port of the handgun17. Hobbs' defense team
argued that the finding of Archuleta, Sr.'s DNA on the handgun supported Hobbs' assertion of self-defense at trial. Specifically, a finding
that Archuleta, Sr. came into contact with the gun supported Hobbs'
description of a struggle over the gun, and his claim that at the time

7. Id. at para. 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at para. 5.
10. Id.
11. Id. at para. 6.
12. Id.
13. Id. at para. 11.
14. Id. at para. 8.
15. N M Stat. Ann. § 31-1A-2 (West 2019); see discussion infra (regarding petitioners who claim self-defense being unable to assert innocence and prove that identity
was an issue at trial).
16. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44, at para. 9.
17. Id. at para. 16.
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of the shooting, he was in fear of death or great bodily harm from Archuleta, Sr.18
Inasmuch as post-conviction DNA statutes were initially drafted
in order to offer relief to individuals who can prove "actual innocence" (that someone else was the perpetrator), they tend to exclude
individuals who may be able to prove they are not guilty (by reason
of affirmative defense), or "legally innocent"19. Black's Law Dictionary
defines innocence as "[t]he absence of guilt; esp., freedom from guilt
for a particular offense"20. It further differentiates between "actual"
and "legal" innocence by defining "actual innocence" as "[t]he absence
of facts that are prerequisites for the sentence given to a defendant"
and "legal innocence" as "[t]he absence of one or more procedural or
legal bases to support the sentence given to a defendant"21. In fact, individuals may be wrongfully convicted if they acted in self-defense;
out of necessity; when involuntarily intoxicated; or, under conditions of duress or insanity, because in these cases no crime actually
occurred22. For this reason, these kinds of convictions are termed "no
crime" wrongful convictions, as one of the fundamental elements for
criminal liability is lacking23. "No crime" wrongful convictions may
also occur when an alleged victim's reputation for violence is excluded
at trial; when flawed jury instructions are given; and when the prosecutor misrepresents the self-defense justification24.
New Mexico's post-conviction DNA statute, in conformity
with several other states' statutes25, requires a person who seeks
18. See Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (the state has appealed the 5th Judicial District
Court's grant of a new trial for Gregory Hobbs, and the case has been granted certiorari by the New Mexico Supreme Court).
19. For the purposes of this Article, actual innocence and innocence will not be
differentiated, and the terms legal innocence and not guilty will likewise be treated
equally, to avoid confusion based on semantics.
20. See
Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters 2019).
21. Id.
22. James R. Acker and Sishi Wu
Defenses Produce Wrongful Convictions, 98 Neb. L. Rev 578, 579 (2020).
23. Id.; see also Jessica S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted of Crimes That Never Happened, 55 Am. Crim. L. Rev 665, 666 (2018) (defining "no crime" wrongful convictions as convictions that occur when no crime ever
occurred, "for events that were never criminal or that never even happened.").
24. Acker and Wu
at 621-622 (cited in note 22).
25. See Analysis in Part 3.
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post-conviction DNA testing to claim innocence and establish that
the identity of the perpetrator was an issue at trial26. An individual
who has killed another person in self-defense, like Gregory Hobbs,
may be unable to claim innocence, but at the same time may be not
guilty because no crime was committed27. Jurisdictions are divided on
whether to grant post-conviction DNA testing motions for individuals who asserted self-defense at trial, specifically due to the issue of
identity28. Since jurisdictions are divided on this issue, and there is
no case precedent in New Mexico, district courts should be provided
with a clear direction. New Mexico's legislature should provide the
courts with clarity: either courts will allow convicted persons who asserted affirmative defenses to petition for post-conviction DNA testing, or prohibit this category from seeking testing.
This article argues that New Mexico's post-conviction DNA statute should be amended to remove both requirements that petitioners claim innocence, and that petitioners establish that the identity of
the perpetrator was an issue at trial. This amendment would conform
with the otherwise liberal statutory requirements of New Mexico's
post-conviction DNA statute and prevent the exclusion of a category
of wrongfully convicted persons. Other states, such as Maryland29,
have already rectified the exclusion of individuals who claimed selfdefense by removing these statutory requirements. Removing these
limitations would allow wrongfully convicted inmates who claimed
self-defense at trial to attempt to exonerate themselves through DNA
evidence.

26. See N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
27. Acker and Wu
at 624 (cited in note 22); see also No
Crime in Glossary (The National Registry of Exoneration), available at https://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited April 20, 2021)
(defining "no crime" wrongful convictions); see also Guilty, Black's Law Dictionary
(Thomson Reuters 2019) (defined as "having committed a crime; responsible for a
crime").
28. Compare Davis v. State, 11 So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that persons who claimed self-defense cannot claim that identity was an issue at trial),
with State v. Braa, 410 P.3d 1176 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018), review denied, 424 P.3d 1225
(Wash. 2018) (holding that persons who claimed self-defense can claim that identity
was an issue at trial).
29. See Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1005 (Md. 2009).
Vol. 3:1 (2021)
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Part 2 of this article's analysis section explains how post-conviction DNA testing can be used to exonerate "no crime" wrongfully convicted persons30. Part 3 further explores how different states' DNA
testing statutes have been interpreted and applied in criminal cases.
Part 4 examines New Mexico's legislation on the matter and proposes
amendments to the statute. Part 5 finally discusses potential concerns
to the proposed amendments and explains why lessening the statutory burden on access to post-conviction DNA testing will not result
in a flood of overturned convictions.
1.1. Background
Wrongful convictions have recently become a topic of increased
concern and public outcry, partly due to media attention following the
publication of Just Mercy by Bryan Stevenson31. The term "wrongful
conviction", as commonly understood, describes when the wrong person is charged and convicted of a crime.32 The wrong person may be
convicted of a crime for many reasons, including false identification
by witnesses and false confessions33. The Innocence Project's mission
is to exonerate these individuals, and to date it has succeeded in exonerating 375 "wrong person" wrongfully convicted individuals34.
This kind of wrongful convictions account for some, but not for
all wrongful convictions35. Cases where no crime has actually occurred may result in "no crime" wrongful convictions36. This type of
30. Jessica S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire at 666 (cited in note 23) (defining "no
crime" wrongful convictions as convictions that occur when no crime ever occurred,
"for events that were never criminal or that never even happened.").
31. Bryan Stevenson,
(Spiegel and Grau, 2014).
32. Acker and Wu
at 579 (cited in note 22).
33. DNA Exoneration in the United States (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited April 20, 2020) (for further data on wrongful convictions, see Appendix 1).
34. Id. The Innocence Project was founded in 1992 by Peter Neufeld and Barry
Scheck at the Cardozo School of Law. It aims to exonerate wrongfully convicted persons through DNA testing and acts to reform the current criminal justice system to
prevent further wrongful convictions (further information available at https://innocenceproject.org/about/) (last visited 20 April, 2020).
35. Acker and Wu
at 578-581 (cited in note 22).
36. Id. at 581-582 (2020); see also S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire at 666 (cited in note
23).
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conviction may occur when a person kills in self-defense, and the trier
of fact convicts the individual of a homicide charge37. These wrongful
convictions are linked to failed self-defense claims38. "No crime" and
"wrong person" wrongful convictions result in the same unjust outcome: a person who has not committed a crime is sent to prison, or
even executed, erroneously39.
DNA testing, which first became viable in 198540. has enabled
wrongfully convicted persons to exonerate themselves in quite a
few cases41. Deoxyribonucleic acid, known as DNA, contains the
genetic makeup, often described as a blueprint, of a person, animal,
plant, or microbe. DNA testing is thus an incredibly powerful tool,
which can be used to both identify criminal suspects and exonerate
wrongfully accused or convicted persons42. Identification of suspects
in criminal cases is done by comparing DNA evidence taken from a
crime scene with either an identified suspect's DNA, or by running
it through DNA databases, such as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)43. The same methodology can exonerate suspects and
wrongfully convicted individuals44, either by proving that someone
37. Acker and Wu,
at 581-582 (cited in note 22). See also
2020 NMCA 44 (citedi in note 1).
38. Acker and Wu, "I Did It, but ... I Didn't" at 621-622 (cited in note 22).
39. DNA Exoneration in the United States (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited April 20, 2020).
40. Randy James, A Brief History of DNA Testing, (Time, Jun. 19, 2009), available
at http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1905706,00.html (last visited April 18, 2021).
41. DNA Exoneration in the United States (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/, (last
visited April 20, 2020).
42. Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA To Solve Crime (March
7, 2017) (The U.S. Department of Justice Archives), available at https://www.justice.
gov/archives/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes (last visited April 20, 2020).
43. Id. (CODIS is an FBI tool, allowing federal, state, and local forensic laboratories to link forensic evidence to stored DNA profiles of known offenders). See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) (FBI, Laboratory Services), available at https://www.
fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited April 20, 2020).
44. Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA To Solve Crime (March
7, 2017) (The U.S. Department of Justice Archives), available at https://www.justice.
Vol. 3:1 (2021)
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else committed the crime, or, as seen in the Hobbs case, supporting a
theory of defense45.
A retrospective study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the percentage of wrongful convictions which could have
been overturned by post-conviction DNA testing46. Researchers conducted a survey of an unbiased sample of 715 homicides and sexual
assaults, which resulted in convictions, between the years 1973 and
198747. This survey determined that among its sample of convicted
offenders, 8% were eliminated as contributors of probative evidence
(evidence related to the conviction), and 5% were eliminated as contributors of any evidence, supporting exoneration48. Given the advent
of DNA testing technology in 1985, it is likely that these percentages
may be lower today, due to its application49. However, these statistics
have already demonstrated that DNA testing is an effective tool that
can be used to overturn wrongful convictions.
In response to the realization that wrongfully convicted individuals may be exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing, all fifty
states as well as the federal government have enacted statutes regarding the subject50. These statutes allow convicted individuals to petition
a court for DNA testing of evidence that was not previously subject to
gov/archives/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes (last visited April 20, 2020).
45. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1).
46. John Roman, et al., Post-Conviction DNA Testing and Wrongful Conviction,
Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, at 5 (Research Report, funded by the U.S. DOJ,
Jun. 2012).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Exonerations By Year And Type Of Crime (The National Registry of Exonerations), available at https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year-Crime-Type.aspx (last visited April 20, 2021). As of April 5, 2021
there have been 2,760 exonerations in the U.S., with an increase in exonerations of
"all types of crime" since 1991 (41 exonerations) to a height in 2016 (181 exonerations).
The rate of exonerations decreased in 2020 to 129 exonerations for "all crimes," which
may indicate that fewer wrongful convictions have occurred since application of
DNA forensics in criminal cases.
50. Access To Post-Conviction DNA Testing (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/
(last visited April 20, 2021) (stating that all 50 states now have post-conviction DNA
statutes).
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DNA testing, that was not previously subject to the current forensic
method of DNA testing, or that was either tested or interpreted incorrectly at trial.51 If an individual is granted post-conviction DNA testing, a district court will consider what relief, if any, may be sought.52
State legislatures are not alone in their attempts to proactively address the nationwide problem of wrongful convictions. Some state
prosecutors have created their own protocols to seek DNA testing
for inmates convicted prior to the early 1990s53, to determine whether
exonerating evidence could be provided using current technology54.
However, other prosecutors believe exonerations based on this technology may expose police and prosecutorial misconduct as well as
systemic flaws and thus threaten the credibility of the criminal justice
system55.
Notably, the Attorney General's office in Virginia prevented testing of DNA which might have exonerated two men who had already
been executed, for fear of the public discovering that the state had
sentenced to death innocent men56. In 1997, then Texas Governor
George W. Bush pardoned Kevin Byrd, a man convicted of sexually
assaulting a pregnant woman57. The pardon was a result of exculpatory DNA testing, which could not have been performed prior to Byrd's
trial in 198558. Because the Harris County Clerk's Office had stored
the biological evidence taken during the rape kit, Mr. Byrd was successfully exonerated59. Bush predicted that the re-examination of biological evidence in Harris County would lead to more exonerations60.
However, the Harris County Clerk's Office began "systematically
destroying" rape kits in its possession, thus ruling out the possibility
51. See e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(D) (West 2019).
52. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019).
53. DNA testing was unavailable prior to 1985, so inmates convicted prior to 1990
may have DNA evidence that was not previously tested.
54. Seth F. Kreimer and David Rudovsky,
cence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 547, 557-58 (2002).
55. Id. at 562.
56. Id.
57. Cynthia E. Jones,
gical Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1239 (2005).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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of further exonerations based on old evidence61. State post-conviction
DNA statutes effectively mitigate undue prosecutorial intervention
by enabling convicted individuals who meet specific criteria to seek
DNA testing62.
For inmates who have newly discovered evidence, or whose DNA
evidence was previously unable to be tested63, post-conviction DNA
testing statutes are often the only gateway to seeking justice. However, post-conviction DNA testing statutes vary widely among the
states in terms of their requirements for petitions64. At the outset,
the majority of states limit post-conviction DNA testing categorically
by case type65. For example, both Kentucky and Nevada bar access to
post-conviction DNA testing to all convicted prisoners except those
convicted of a capital offense ("a crime for which the death penalty
may be imposed"66).
The majority of states, including New Mexico, require that the
convicted individual claim innocence67. In addition, many states,
again including New Mexico, require individuals to establish that the
identity of the perpetrator was at issue at trial68. As we will discuss
further below, these overly burdensome statutory limitations on access to post-conviction DNA testing should be removed in order to
prevent the exclusion of a specific category of convicted persons. A
person convicted after a failed self-defense claim (such as Mr. Hobbs)
may be wrongfully convicted, as no crime has been committed. The
fundamental question is whether a person who has been wrongfully
61. Id. at 1240.
62. See e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
63. Post-conviction DNA testing may also be conducted when new technology is
available. See, e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
64. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev.1629
(2008) (for further discussion, see Analysis in Part 2 and Appendix 2).
65. Id. at 1679–80.
66. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 422.285 (West 2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
34.724 (West 2020). See also Offense, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters
2019).
67. See infra, Analysis in Part 2 and note 124. See also, Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1680–81 (2008) (some states require an affidavit claiming innocence in the petition for post-conviction DNA testing). See, e.g., Cal
Pen Code § 1405 (West 2015).
68. See infra note 124. See also N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
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convicted should be prevented from seeking justice only because they
cannot claim innocence or prove that another perpetrator was at fault.
2. Analysis. Post-Conviction DNA evidence
2.1. Exoneration through Post-Conviction DNA Testing
An individual can be wrongfully convicted when they are actually
innocent of the alleged criminal act69. This type of conviction generally occurs when the wrong person was accused and convicted of a
crime70. An individual may also be wrongfully convicted when they
asserted a self-defense claim at trial which failed71. Erroneous convictions based on a failed self-defense claim (where a convicted person
actually acted in self-defense) are "no crime" wrongful convictions72
as an individual who acts in self-defense has committed no criminal
act and is therefore not guilty73.
"No crime" wrongful convictions occur for many reasons, including: erroneous exclusion of an alleged victim's reputation for violence
at trial; flawed jury instructions; and prosecutorial misrepresentation

69. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-411 (West 2003) (defining actual innocence
as "clear and convincing evidence such that no reasonable juror would have convicted
the defendant"); see also Innocent, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters 2019)
(cited in note 20) (defined as "Someone who has not, in a given situation, committed any harmful act; a person who is blameless in a particular setting") (for the purposes of this Article, requiring a petitioner to assert or establish actual innocence is
not differentiated from requiring a petitioner to establish innocence in petitions for
post-conviction DNA testing).
70. DNA Exoneration in the United States (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited April 20, 2020).
71. Acker and Wu
at 624 (cited in note 22).
72. Id.; see also Glossary (The National Registry of Exonerations), available at
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited
April 20, 2021) (defining "no crime" wrongful convictions). See also S. Henry, Smoke
but No Fire at 666 (cited in note 23).
73. See Guilty, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters 2019) (defined as "having committed a crime; responsible for a crime"). See also S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire
at 666 (cited in note 23).
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of the self-defense justification74. Scholarly literature on the subject
of self-defense claims and wrongful convictions is limited; however,
James Acker and Sishi Wu discussed nineteen cases of exoneration of
persons that had been wrongfully convicted due to failed self-defense
claim75.
The advent of DNA testing in 1985 resulted in both convictions
based on biological evidence and exonerations76. The combined sentence served by individuals who were later exonerated through postconviction DNA testing result in 5,284 years of imprisonment77.
The first wrongfully convicted person exonerated through postconviction DNA evidence was Gary Dotson, who in 1989 was exonerated after serving ten years for rape and aggravated kidnapping.78
The DNA testing conclusively assessed that the semen found in the
victim's underwear could not have come from Gary Dotson79.
Because of its unequivocal accuracy and reliability in producing
valid identification of perpetrators, DNA evidence is admissible in
all United States courts80. New York became the first state to pass a
post-conviction DNA statute in 1994, with 32 additional states and
the federal government enacting statutes by 200481. Currently, all
states apply statutes that allow inmates to prove innocence82 through
post-conviction DNA testing83. although the limitations and barriers
to testing vary substantially from state to state84.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Acker and Wu
at 621-622 (cited in note 22).
Id.
James, A Brief History of DNA Testing (cited in note 40).
DNA Exoneration in the United States (The Innocence Project), available
at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last visited April 20, 2020) (see Appendix 1 for further discussion of exonerated
individuals).
78. Nicholas Phillips, Innocence and Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of
Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 Univ.
Balt. L.F. 65, 65 (2011).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 66.
81. Id.
82. Or lack of guilt in cases of "no crime" wrongful convictions.
83. (stating that all 50 states now have post-conviction DNA statutes).
84. For further analysis, see Appendix 2.
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2.2 Post-Conviction DNA Testing Petitions
Post-conviction DNA testing may be utilized in cases where DNA
testing of evidence obtained from the scene has never been conducted, and in cases where previously inconclusive DNA evidence can be
re-analyzed to potentially obtain a more probative result due to the
advent of newer technology.85 Newer technology enables DNA testing to produce more conclusive proof of identity than DNA testing
in the early 1990s, when many tests may have yielded inconclusive
results86. Courts are no longer divided on the issue of admissibility of
DNA testing in criminal cases87. However, determining the correct
standard for granting petitions for post-conviction DNA testing is
still an issue88.
A petition to a court for post-conviction DNA testing or other
post-conviction relief is filed as a separate motion with the court, not
as part of the original case89. Procedurally, post-conviction relief petitions act as "expansion[s] of habeas corpus"90, expanding a convicted
individual's ability to seek relief in a limited number of cases.
The specific procedures and policies for petitioning a court for
post-conviction DNA testing vary between the federal government
and the states. Under the federal standard, an individual sentenced to
imprisonment or death for a federal offense may petition the court
for DNA testing of "specific evidence" if many requirements are met91.
These include an assertion of "actual innocence;" that any and all state
remedies have been first exhausted; that the DNA evidence was either not previously tested; or that it was tested using outdated testing
methods; and that at trial the identity of the perpetrator was at issue.92

85. Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing: Determining the
Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 Cap. Univ. L. Rev 243, 244 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. State v. Allen, 283 P.3d 114, 117 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012).
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S. Code § 3600 (West) (federal post-conviction DNA testing code).
92. Id.
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Because post-conviction DNA testing can result in overturned
convictions93, states are wary of granting post-conviction DNA
testing when that testing has the potential to exonerate a convicted
felon94. States have different requirements for granting post-conviction DNA testing petitions95. By requiring petitioners to assert claims
of innocence and/or establish that identity was an issue at trial, many
states, including New Mexico96, exclude petitioners who claimed to
have acted in self-defense. Defendants who assert self-defense claims
at trial have the right to DNA testing of biological evidence as part of
the trial process97. Although convicted individuals do not have equal
due process rights after conviction, asserting a self-defense claim at
trial should not preclude a person from requesting post-conviction
DNA testing.
Because there is presently no case law interpreting New Mexico's
current statute (which includes the requirements of asserting innocence and establishing that the identity of the perpetrator was an
issue) it is likely that courts will refer to other jurisdictions for guidance. However, New Mexico courts will not find a clear answer by
looking at other jurisdictions, due to a lack of concurrence98. New
Mexico should consider amending the statute in order to provide the
courts with clarity on whether individuals who asserted affirmative
defenses may seek post-conviction DNA testing.
2.3. When Relief May be Granted
When a petitioner has been allowed to obtain post-conviction
DNA testing, the results of the test must meet additional standards
for any relief to be granted99. Post-conviction DNA test results may
93. See, e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019) (stating that if the DNA results are exculpatory, a district court may set aside the charges and sentencing, order
a new trial, or grant other relief).
94. Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing at 247 (cited in note 85).
95. See Analysis in Part 3.
96. See Part 2, Section 2.
97. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 387 P.3d 153, 164 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (where defendant who claimed to have stabbed victim in self-defense was entitled to seek DNA
testing of evidence before trial).
98. See Part 3.
99. See, e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019).
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exclude a convicted person as a source, create reasonable doubt as to
guilt, or may be inconclusive100. State and federal courts in the United
States generally require that the results "prove innocence"101. Additionally, many states impose time restrictions for introduction of newly
discovered evidence after conviction and sentencing, thereby limiting
access to relief in order to "ensure the integrity of the trial process"102.
Certain states, including Oregon, avoid potential injustices by allowing judicial discretion, so that a judge may waive the time restriction
in the interest of justice103.
In addition to statutory limitations that restrict a person's ability
to seek relief, cost also may prohibit some indigent convicted persons
from petitioning the court104. Convicted individuals often rely on innocence or justice projects, such as The Innocence Project, or The
New Mexico Innocence and Justice Project, or other state equivalents
for legal and financial support in post-conviction proceedings105. The
state funded projects, such as The New Mexico Innocence and Justice
Project, are often limited by financial restrictions which may reduce
the number of cases the projects can take on106.
The Innocence Protection Act, codified in part under Chapter 18 of
the United States Code, provides differing procedures for relief, dependent on the results of post-conviction DNA tests107. If the testing
produces inconclusive results, a court may order additional testing, or

85).

100. Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing at 247 (cited in note

101. Id. Citing National Institute of Justice,
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, 10
(1996).
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id.
105. Exonerate the Innocence (The Innocence Project), available at https://www.
innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited 20 April, 2020).
106. New Mexico Innocence and Justice Project (The University of New Mexico
School of Law), https://lawschool.unm.edu/ijp/index.html. Explaining that funding comes from state grants and requesting private funding by donors to continue
its services.
107. 18 U.S. Code § 3600 (West 2016). The Innocence Protection Act has been
cited in state court cases involving post-conviction DNA testing; see, e.g., In re Towne,
195 Vt. 42, 86 A.3d 429, 432 (2013).
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deny any relief108. In the event testing produces inculpatory results, the
government may: (1) deny relief; (2) hold the applicant in contempt if
the application included a false claim of "actual innocence;" (3) assess
charges for the DNA testing; (4) deny good conduct credit through
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; and (5) deny parole if the prisoner is under jurisdiction of the United States Parole Commission109.
If the results produce exculpatory results, "exclud[ing] the applicant
as the source of the DNA evidence," the applicant may file a motion
for a new trial or resentencing110. Courts shall grant motions for new
trial or resentencing if the DNA test results (considered in addition to
all other evidence in the case) "establish by compelling evidence" that
a new trial would result in acquittal of the federal offense111, or they
shall grant a motion for resentencing if the DNA evidence was first
admitted during a federal sentencing hearing, and exoneration of the
offense entitles the applicant "to a reduced sentence or a new sentencing proceeding"112.
The federal courts have analyzed the due process rights of convicted persons in relation to post-conviction relief. The United States
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland set a standard for post-conviction relief when it held that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment113[...]". In
Brady, Justice Douglas stated, "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly"114.
The Court agreed that suppression of evidence by the prosecution
at trial deprived the defendant of their due process rights under the

108. 18 U.S. Code § 3600(f) (West 2016).
109. 18 U.S. Code § 3600(f) (West 2016).
110. 18 U.S. Code § 3600(g) (West 2016).
111. 18 U.S. Code § 3600(g)(2)(A) (West 2016).
112. 18 U.S. Code § 3600(g)(2)(B) (West 2016).
113. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (the Supreme Court in Osborne
(Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009)),
held that the Brady framework should not be applied to post-conviction cases).
114. Id. at 87.
Trento Student Law Review

Unnecessary Burdens to Post-Conviction DNA Testing

105

Fourteenth Amendment115; however, it declined to declare Maryland
court's denial of a new trial a Due Process Clause violation116.
The Court in U.S. v. Laureano-Salgado recently considered the
Brady standard as more "defendant-friendly." The Court noted that,
although a motion for a new trial requires that (1) the evidence was
unknown or unavailable at trial; and (2) the evidence could not have
been discovered at trial through due diligence, the Brady standard
amended the third and fourth requirements of Peake117 to require that
petitioners demonstrate "a reasonable probability that [...] the result
of the proceeding would have been different"118. The Supreme Court
held in Osborne that the Brady standard should not be applied to postconviction proceedings, because convicted individuals do not enjoy
the same liberty interests as free men119. The Court held that once a
person is convicted, there is no longer a presumption of innocence120.
It also held that a convicted person must no longer be afforded due
process by the state, and deemed state post-conviction relief procedures as a "choice" not dictated by due process121.
The federal courts have held that claims of "actual innocence" are
not themselves constitutional claims afforded due process, but that in
some cases act as "gateways" for petitioners to pass through to have
"otherwise barred" claims considered122.
States differ in their requirements for relief based on post-conviction DNA testing, due to varying statutory rules. For example, in
Maryland, favorable post-conviction DNA test results may allow a
petitioner to have a post-conviction hearing; or, if the results show
a "substantial possibility" that the original jury would not have convicted the petitioner at trial, a court may order a new trial instead of
115. Id. at 86.
116. Id. at 90.
117. U.S. v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that "(3) is material, not just
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) is sufficiently compelling that it would probably
produce an acquittal at a retrial").
118. U.S. v. Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2019).
119. Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68
(2009).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
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the hearing123. Delaware permits motions for post-conviction DNA
testing only within three years of the date of conviction, and requires
the DNA test results establish "actual innocence"124. A petitioner may
be granted a new trial in Delaware only if the petitioner establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable jury, when considering the DNA test results with the other evidence at trial, would have
convicted the petitioner125.
New Mexico requires the results of the DNA testing be "exculpatory" in order for a district court to either: (1) set aside the judgement
and sentence; (2) dismiss charges with prejudice; (3) order a new trial;
or (4) order other appropriate relief126.
3. Analysis of state post-conviction dna testing statutory requirements
3.1. States Requiring Petitioners Assert Innocence
At least twenty-six states and the District of Columbia require petitioners, under state statute, to assert a claim of "actual innocence"127
or establish innocence, on a petition to the court for post-conviction DNA testing128. Among these state statutes requiring claims of
123. Nicholas Phillips, Innocence and Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of
Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 Univ.
Balt. L. Forum 65, 73-74 (2011).
124. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (West 2000).
125. Id.
126. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019).
127. Innocence, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters 2019) (actual innocence is defined as: "The absence of facts that are prerequisites for the sentence given
to a defendant") (for the purposes of this Article, requiring a petitioner to assert or
establish actual innocence is not differentiated from requiring a petitioner to establish innocence in petitions for post-conviction DNA testing).
128. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-18-200 (2020); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(6)-(7)
(West 2005); Cal. Penal Code § 1405(b) (West 2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1411 (West 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (West 2000); D.C. Code Ann. §
22-4133 (West 2001); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(B)(2)-(3) (2010); Idaho Code Ann. § 194902 (West 2012); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/116-3 (West 2014); Iowa Code Ann. §
81.10(d) (West 2019); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 2137 (2019); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
278A, § 3(d) (West 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.01 (West 2005) (held unconstitutional by Reynolds v. State (Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016), on time
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innocence, much variation is found both in the specific wording of
the statutes129 and in the judiciary application of those statutes.
At least fourteen state statutes which require claims of innocence
also require the identity of the perpetrator of the crime to have been
an issue at trial130. Arkansas' post-conviction DNA testing statute has
some of the strictest requirements, requiring a petitioner to: (1) include a theory of defense establishing petitioner's "actual innocence"
and (2) requiring that the identity of the perpetrator must have been
an issue at trial131. Arkansas additionally requires that petitioners did
not plead guilty at trial, this because the state has determined that if a
petitioner pled guilty, identity could not have been an issue at trial132.
Requiring petitioners to assert innocence excludes petitioners
who claimed self-defense and other justification defenses from successfully petitioning a court for post-conviction DNA testing, which
may absolve them of guilt133. Petitioners whose failed self-defense
claims resulted in "no crime" wrongful convictions are at risk of having their petitions denied because of semantics. A petitioner who asserted a self-defense claim at trial claims to be not guilty by reason of
affirmative defense. Not guilty in this context is not equivalent to an
assertion of innocence as required by statute134.

limit of 2 years, has not been revised as of Oct. 19, 2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 547.035
(West 2018); N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30
(McKinney 2020); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 29-32.1-15 (West 2019); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2953.74 (West 2010); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1373.2 (West 2020); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 138.692 (West 2020); 42 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(6) (West
2018); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03 (West 2017); Utah Code Ann. § 78B9-301 (West 2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5566(a)(1) (West 2020); Va. Code Ann. §
19.2-327.3 (West 2020); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 974.07 (West 2011).
129. See supra note 124.
130. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 81.10(d) (West 2019) (the 14 states statutes are
found in footnote 124 and include: Arkansas; California; Delaware; Florida; Idaho;
Illinois; Iowa; Maine; Minnesota; Missouri; North Dakota; Ohio: Oregon; and
Texas).
131. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(6)-(7) (West 2005).
132. See Leach v. State, 580 S.W.3d 871, 872 (Ark. 2019) (for further analysis of
post-conviction DNA testing statutes by state, see Appendix 2).
133. See Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1).
134. See N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
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3.2. Identity at Issue and Lesser Requirements
Several states, which do not require petitioners to assert claims
of innocence in petitions for post-conviction DNA testing, still require the identity of the perpetrator to have been an issue at trial135.
Of these states, New Jersey additionally requires petitioners to show
that if the DNA testing results are favorable, a new trial would likely
be granted136. New Jersey also established the Truth Project in 2001,
which allows inmates to attempt to prove innocence through postconviction DNA testing at the expense of the state137. Michigan also
requires petitioners to show that the DNA evidence itself is material
to the issue of identity138. Hawaii has perhaps the most inclusive statute139. In fact, although it requires identity to have been an issue, the
standard is significantly less restrictive than many of the previously
described state statutes, requiring petitioners to show only that there
exists a reasonable probability of a different verdict140. Washington
imposes a higher standard than Hawaii, requiring petitioners to show
there is a likelihood that the post-conviction DNA testing will demonstrate innocence, based on a standard of more probable than not141.
States requiring identity to have been an issue at trial tend to exclude
petitioners who claimed self-defense or other affirmative defenses at
trial142.
135. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2016); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-541(E) (West 2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123(A)(1), (B)(1) (West 2020); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.16 (West 2015).
136. State v. Armour, 141 A.3d 381, 391 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016).
137. Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing at 266 (cited in note 85).
138. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.16 (West 2015).
139. Based on close evaluation of thirty-three state statutes and the District of
Columbia. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123(A)(1), (B)(1) (West 2020).
140. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123(A)(1), (B)(1) (West 2020).
141. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.73.170 (West 2005).
142. See e.g., State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 2004) (holding that identity
cannot be an issue when a defendant raises a consent or justification defense); see
also People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that when a
defendant raises an affirmative defense, identity ceases to be an issue); but see Davis,
11 So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that self-defense claims do not
preclude identity to have been an issue for post-conviction DNA testing) (cited in
note 28).
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Some statutes do not include clauses requiring identity to be an
issue, but rather concentrate on issues such as reasonable probability
of different outcomes143 or producing exculpatory results144. Maryland
has a similar statutory requirement to Delaware145, requiring a court to
determine, before granting motions for post-conviction DNA testing,
whether there is a reasonable probability that the DNA testing can
scientifically produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence146. Maryland
further defines "exculpatory" as "tends to establish innocence"147. Likewise, Arizona's statute requires petitioners to show that a reasonable
probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted
or convicted if exculpatory DNA results had been available at trial148.
3.3. Further State Imposed Restrictions Based on Timely Filing
Several states and the federal government additionally burden petitioners with time limitations on filing petitions for post-conviction
DNA testing. The federal courts impose on petitioners a one year
statute of limitations for post-conviction DNA testing, unless a court
is persuaded by petitioner's claim of "actual innocence" that no reasonable juror could find petitioner guilty with the newly discovered
evidence149. The majority of states, including New Mexico, allow
petitions for post-conviction DNA testing at any time after sentencing, provided that the evidence is still available for testing150. Some
states, including Pennsylvania, require that petitions shall be filed in a

143. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (2000).
144. See, e.g., Givens v. State, 188 A.3d 903, 912 (Md. 2018).
145. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (West 2000).
146. Givens, 188 A.3d 903, 912 (cited in note 144).
147. Id. at 914.
148. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (2000).
149. Carter v. Klee, 286 F. Supp. 3d 846, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2018),
lability denied, 14-14792, 2018 WL 10440862 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2018).
150. See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/116-3 (West 2014); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-4240 (2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123 (West 2020); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
22, § 1373.2 (West 2020); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-4902 (West 2020); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-301(West 2018); 42 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(4) (West 2018);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-303 (West 2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 925.11(1)(b) (West 2007);
N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
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"timely manner" but ultimately allow for post-conviction DNA testing
motions to be filed at any time151.
Other states impose additional restrictions on petitioners' ability
to request post-conviction DNA testing by limiting the time available
for petitioners to submit motions152. Georgia has one of the most exclusionary policies, requiring all post-conviction motions to be filed
within 30 days from sentencing or conviction153. Michigan's procedural requirement is similar to that of Georgia; a petitioner convicted
after January 8, 2001, must file a motion for post-conviction DNA
testing within 60 days of the conviction; however, a petitioner convicted before January 8, 2001 may file a motion at any time154. Maine,
Delaware and New York also impose time limits for petition filing155.
The Innocence Project lists many proposed amendments to the
fifty state statutes which contain excessive burdens on access to postconviction DNA testing156. The list includes the removal of "sunset
provisions," which the project describes as "absolute deadlines" such
as those provided in the statutes of Georgia, Michigan, Maine, Delaware, and New York157.

151. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(4) (West 2018).
152. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2020); Me. Rev. Stat.
tit. 15, § 2137 (2019); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2000); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 770.2 (West 2015); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-41(E) (West 2015).
153. Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-41 (E) (West 2015).
154. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 770.16(1), 770.2 (West 2015).
155. Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 2137 (2019) (requiring petitions be filed two years after
date of conviction, or if testing is requested due to newly available DNA testing technology, within two years of the time the new technology is available); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2000) (imposing a statute of limitations for post-conviction
remedies of three years); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2020) (imposing a five-year statutory limitation unless "extraordinary circumstance[s]" made it
impossible to test the DNA evidence within the five years after conviction).
156. Access to Post-Conviction DNA testing (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/
(last visited 20, April 2020).
157. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, §
2137 (2019); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2000); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
770.2 (West 2015); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-41 (E) (West 2015) (for further discussion of
state statutes, see Appendix 2).
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4. Analysis of New Mexico's Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute
4.1. New Mexico's Statutory Requirements for Post-Conviction DNA
Testing
The state of New Mexico allows any person convicted of a felony,
who claims that DNA evidence will establish their innocence, to petition the district court of the convicting jurisdiction for DNA testing158.
The statute requires that a petitioner show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence was not previously subject to DNA testing (or to the current DNA testing available)159; that the DNA testing
will likely produce admissible evidence160; and that the identity of the
perpetrator was at issue161. The New Mexico statute includes allowances for petitioners who meet the above-mentioned requirements to
be appointed counsel162 and provides that no petitioners shall be denied access to post-conviction DNA evidence due to inability to pay163.
In addition, the statute grants petitioners the right to appeal a court's
denial of the requested DNA testing164. Importantly, New Mexico's
statute requires the state to preserve all evidence from investigations
and prosecutions which could potentially be subject to DNA testing
for the entire period of incarceration, including probation or parole165.
New Mexico's statute does not include a time limit nor does it impede
petitioners who pled guilty from petitioning the court166.
New Mexico's statutory requirements match those of the many
states requiring claims of innocence and that the identity of the perpetrator had been an issue at trial167. This presents a problem for petitioners who claim to be not guilty, by reason of affirmative defense,
158. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(A) (West 2019).
159. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(D) (West 2019).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(E) (West 2019).
163. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(J) (West 2019).
164. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(L) (West 2019).
165. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(M) (West 2019).
166. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
167. See supra note 124 (the states include: Arkansas; California; Delaware; Florida; Idaho; Illinois; Iowa; Maine; Minnesota; Missouri; North Dakota: Ohio; Oregon,
and Texas).
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and who cannot claim that identity was an issue. These statutory requirements undermine the possibility of exonerating wrongfully convicted persons, convicted of crimes that they were not responsible for.
4.2. New Mexico Courts' Interpretation and Application of the PostConviction DNA Relief Statute
New Mexico courts have only recently been presented with cases
where interpretation and application of the post-conviction DNA
statute is at stake168. The Hobbs case presented an opportunity for the
New Mexico Court of Appeals to analyze the post-conviction DNA
statute when the prosecutor appealed the defendant's grant of a new
trial based on post-conviction DNA testing169. In
the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to seven
years170. The incident resulting in the victim's death from gunshot
wounds involved a physical altercation, where the defendant alleged
that the victim grabbed the gun in his hand, and attempted to use it
against the defendant171. The defendant raised a claim of self-defense
at trial172.
The Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument that Section
173
A of the post-conviction DNA relief statute requires petitioners to
prove that the results of DNA testing "will establish their innocence"174.
Instead, the court determined that the innocence standard listed in
Section A of the statute only requires petitioners to claim that the
DNA evidence will establish their innocence175. The court ruled that
criminal defendants have a "fundamental interest" in avoiding wrongful conviction176 and that New Mexico courts when deciding whether
relief should be granted under the statute, should balance the interest
168. See, e.g., Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1); State v. Duran, 2020 WL
3440537 (N.M. Ct. App. June 22, 2020) (Both cases have been granted certiorari by
the New Mexico Supreme Court and are thus pending review).
169. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 at para. 20 (cited in note 1).
170. Id. at para. 7.
171. Id. at para. 2-3.
172. Id. at para. 3.
173. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(A) (West 2019).
174. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 at para. 32; N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(A) (West 2019).
175. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 at para. 32 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at para. 37.
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of the defendant in avoiding wrongful conviction with the "public's
interest in the finality of a conviction" and the interests of the victim177.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the issue of when relief
should be granted based on post-conviction DNA evidence178. The
court held that the DNA evidence must be material to the issue of
innocence of the petitioner and that it must raise a reasonable probability that had the evidence been available at trial, the petitioner
would not have pled guilty or been convicted179. The court explained
that the New Mexico legislature when drafting the statute, "expected"
that DNA evidence, which is exculpatory, would have led to a different outcome at trial180. The court defined the term "exculpatory" in
Hobbs as "evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt"181. The court announced a novel standard that New Mexico courts shall apply when
deciding whether to grant post-conviction relief based on exculpatory
DNA evidence182.
The Court of Appeals had an additional opportunity to review the
post-conviction DNA relief statute in State v. Duran183 the companion
case to Hobbs. The Duran case also involved a district court's denial of
the defendant's motion for relief based on the results of post-conviction DNA testing184. The defendant in Duran filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing under the statute twenty-eight years after his
conviction in 1987 for murder and armed robbery185. The defendant in
Duran requested post-conviction DNA testing of evidence found on
the victim; specifically, DNA recovered underneath the victim's fingernails, and multiple hairs found on the victim186. The results of the
post-conviction DNA testing eliminated the defendant as a contributor to the DNA evidence187. The Court of Appeals reversed the district
177. Id. (quoting Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007 NMSC 35, 29, 142 N.M. 89).
178. Id. at para. 24.
179. Id. at para. 38.
180. Id. at para. 41.
181. Id. at para. 1 (quoting Buzbee v. Donnelly, 1981-NMSC-097, para. 45, 96 N.M.
692).
182. Id. at para. 42.
183. Duran, 2020 WL 3440537 at para. 1 (cited in note 168).
184. Id. at para. 1, 12.
185. Id. at para. 1, 7.
186. Id. at para. 11.
187. Id.
Vol. 3:1 (2021)

114

Samantha Catalano

court's denial of the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief
based on the DNA testing, and remanded the case for reconsideration
according to the new standard announced in Hobbs188.
Because both Hobbs and Duran have been granted certiorari by the
New Mexico Supreme Court189, it is currently unknown how the Supreme Court will decide the outcome of these cases. However, because
these cases are the first to examine the post-conviction DNA statute,
the Court may set a clear standard for the lower courts to apply. The
Hobbs case may help bring to light problems with the statute, importantly the exclusion of petitioners who claimed self-defense at trial
and may be wrongfully convicted.
4.3. The Problem with the Requirement of Identity as an Issue and
Claims of Innocence
New Mexico is not an outlier of states requiring identity to be an
issue at trial, or in requiring petitioners to state a claim of innocence
within their petitions for post-conviction DNA testing190. However,
several states' post-conviction DNA statutes do not include a requirement for petitioners to assert innocence191. Only a few states' statutes
do not include the requirement of identity as an issue at trial192.
The problem with states requiring claims of innocence193 from petitioners who seek to exonerate themselves from potentially erroneous convictions or sentences is that some petitioners may be unable to
meet the heavy burden of proving that no reasonable juror could have
convicted them given the evidence. For example, in cases like Hobbs194
188. Id. at para. 23; see also Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 at para. 42 (cited in note 1).
189. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1); Duran, 2020 WL 3440537 (cited
in note 168).
190. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202 (West 2005); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §
1405 (West 2015).
191. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-41 (E)
(West 2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123 (West 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 770.16 (West 2015); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2016); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 10.73.170 (West 2005).
192. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (West 2018); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-4240 (2000).
193. Or actual innocence.
194. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1).
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because the defendant raised a claim of self-defense, it is possible that
a "reasonable juror" could convict because no other perpetrator was
implicated.
Convicted individuals who claim self-defense or other affirmative
defenses may be preempted from petitioning the court for post-conviction DNA testing based on the stringent requirement for claiming
innocence. The requirement for claiming innocence seems to be interpreted by the courts to mean that petitioners must claim that someone else was responsible, like in the Duran case, where DNA testing
conclusively eliminated the defendant as the source of DNA evidence
found on the victim195. Requiring all petitioners to, under oath, claim
innocence under penalty of law seems unnecessarily burdensome,
and may exclude petitioners who claim to be not guilty based on
self-defense.
States are widely divided on whether petitioners who claim to be
not guilty of a crime based on an affirmative defense, such as selfdefense, are entitled to post-conviction DNA testing. Some states are
of the opinion that identity is no longer an issue after petitioners state
affirmative defense claims, while other states hold that these petitioners may not be summarily denied post-conviction DNA testing196.
For example, Maine courts have held that identity is always at issue
in criminal trials unless a defendant admits to an act by asserting an
affirmative defense197. Illinois has a similar rule, holding that when a
defendant claims any affirmative defense, identity is no longer at issue.198 In People v. Urioste, an Illinois court held, "[i]t would make no
sense to allow DNA testing in cases where identity was not the issue at
the trial"199. By holding that convicted individuals who asserted an affirmative defense are unable to claim that identity was an issue at trial,
195. Duran, 2020 WL 3440537 at para. 11 (cited in note 168).
196. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 2004) (holding that identity cannot be an issue when a defendant raises a consent or justification defense); see
also People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that when a
defendant raises an affirmative defense, identity ceases to be an issue); but see Davis,
11 So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that self-defense claims do not
preclude identity to have been an issue for post-conviction DNA testing) (cited in
note 28).
197. State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 2004).
198. People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 714 (cited in note 196).
199. Id.
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these states prevent these individuals from seeking post-conviction
DNA testing.
By contrast, some states, including Florida and Washington, have
held that it is inappropriate to summarily deny post-conviction DNA
testing to petitioners who claim to have acted in self-defense based
on the issue of identity200. In
the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for postconviction DNA testing, where the denial was based on petitioner's
assertion of self-defense.201 The trial court had denied the petition
because it felt the petitioner's self-defense claim negated the possibility that the identity of the perpetrator had been an issue at trial202. The
court of appeals, however, held that petitions for testing should not be
summarily denied because the defendant did not deny the act which
was alleged to be criminal203. The court ruled that the correct standard
to apply when determining whether to grant a petition, is considering
whether the DNA testing would have had a reasonable probability, if
available at trial, of resulting in an acquittal or lesser sentence204.
Similarly, Washington courts have held that individuals who
claimed self-defense can state that identity was an issue at trial, because it is the identity of the perpetrator, which the court differentiates from the commissioner of an act205. In Braa, the court rejected the
state's proposition that because the defendant's identity as the shooter
was not at issue at trial, the DNA evidence would be immaterial to
the issue of identity. The court explained that the evidence must be
relevant to the identity of the perpetrator206. The court held that a
person who kills another in lawful self-defense is "not a perpetrator"
and that if convicted, the person is "misidentified as the perpetrator"
making the identity of the perpetrator an issue within the meaning of
the statute207. The court further established that petitioners who claim
self-defense should not be denied post-conviction DNA testing,
200. See, e.g., Davis, 11 So. 3d 977, 978; Braa, 410 P.3d 1176 (cited in note 28).
201. Davis, 11 So. 3d 977, 978 (cited in note 28).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Braa, 410 P.3d 1176 (cited in note 28).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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when that testing may establish innocence of the alleged crime208.
In addition, the court held that if the legislature intended to restrict
post-conviction DNA testing for individuals claiming self-defense,
this would be evidence of "perverse legislative intent" where a statute
is enacted "to free some-but not all-innocent persons"209.
4.4. Proposed Resolution to the Exclusion of Petitioners
New Mexico's post-conviction DNA testing statute, when considered in relation to other states' statutes, could be described as somewhat liberal210. However, New Mexico's statute still requires the petitioner to assert innocence and that the identity of the perpetrator be
an issue at trial211. As described above, requiring identity to have been
an issue at trial has been interpreted both to include and to exclude
individuals who claim self-defense212. This ambiguity in jurisdictional
authority, seems to exclude such individuals without good cause. As
the discussion above shows, there is no clear precedent for New Mexico to follow. Without direction from the legislature, petitioners who
are wrongfully convicted (for "no crime" wrongful convictions), may
be unable to access post-conviction DNA testing.
Many states have recognized that certain requirements of postconviction DNA testing statutes are unfair when applied to some
categories of individuals. For example, several states including New
Mexico and Texas have allowed individuals who pled guilty at trial to
petition the court for DNA testing, in order to allow those individuals who may have been coerced into confessing or conceded guilt, to
avoid more lengthy sentences, and establish their innocence213. This
208. Braa, 410 P.3d 1176 (cited in note 28).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 547.035 (West 2018) (requiring a claim that DNA
testing will yield evidence of actual innocence); Ala. Code § 15-18-200 (2020) (only
allowing petitioners convicted of Capital offenses who are awaiting execution to petition for post-conviction DNA testing).
211. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
212. Braa, 410 P.3d 1176 (cited in note 28).
213. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4133 (West 2001); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 925.11(1)(a)
(West 2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 844D-123(b)(1) (West 2020); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 278A, § 3(d) (West 2012); N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019); Or. Rev. Stat.
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type of statutory allowance aims to prevent individuals seeking postconviction DNA testing from being summarily denied such possibility based on a technicality. The need for revision of the New Mexico
post-conviction DNA statute is apparent when considering cases
such as Hobbs214. In Hobbs, the defendant argued that his post-conviction DNA testing was exculpatory because it weakened the state's
argument that the defendant was not under threat of death or bodily
harm at the time of the shooting, thereby supporting his self-defense
claim215. If individuals like Mr. Hobbs are summarily denied DNA
testing which could establish their claims of self-defense, thereby
proving that they are not guilty of the alleged crime, a grave injustice
is done216.
This Article does not aim to resolve the issues discussed in the New
Mexico post-conviction DNA statute but does propose a potential
resolution for purposes of promoting discussion. A revision of the
New Mexico statute could potentially assist petitioners overturn "no
crime" wrongful convictions. An example of a state finding issue with
its post-conviction DNA testing statute and amending said statute is
found in Maryland.
In 2003, Maryland amended its post-conviction DNA testing statute towards a more liberal approach217. The Maryland post-conviction
DNA statute formerly contained both the requirement that petitioners claim "actual innocence" and show that identity had been an issue
at trial218. The statute was amended in 2003 to provide for a new standard as to r whether a petitioner should be granted post-conviction
DNA testing. Such a standard requires considering whether there is
a reasonable probability for the DNA testing to produce exculpatory

Ann. § 138.692(3) (West 2020); 42 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(5) (West
2018); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(b) (West 2017).
214. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1).
215. Id. at para. 10.
216. Id. (Mr. Hobbs was granted post-conviction DNA testing, however it seems
likely the current statutory requirements will allow for ambiguous determination by
the district courts when reviewing petitions by individuals convicted after a failed
self-defense claim).
217. See Gregg, 976 A.2d 999 at 1005 (cited in note 29).
218. Id. at 1006.
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or mitigating evidence related to a wrongful conviction or sentence219.
This change in statutory language results in a more lenient approach
to allow for post-conviction DNA testing when appropriate220.
Maryland's statute could be improved upon by removing a requirement that limits indigent petitioners, as it demands all petitioners to
pay the cost of post-conviction DNA testing221. The state reimburses
petitioners if the results are favorable222. This type of cost-based limitation may function to exclude petitioners who cannot afford DNA
testing, providing an unjust barrier to potential relief from wrongful
conviction.
5. Addressing Concerns to Amendment
There is a profound moral imperative in our society to not condemn the innocent. Our criminal justice system has determined that
by requiring a standard of proof beyond any reasonable doubt, innocent people should not be incarcerated for crimes they did not commit223. However, innocent people who had previously been convicted,
were later on exonerated through the advent of DNA testing224. The
moral imperative of not convicting, sentencing, or executing innocent people225 is, in the United States , balanced against the societal
interest in "the finality of convictions"226. The numerous limitations
on access to testing discussed in this Article support a theory that as
a general rule states are more invested in maintaining the finality of
219. Givens, 188 A.3d 903, 912 (cite in note 144); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §
8-201(c) (West 2018).
220. Exonerate the Innocence (The Innocence Project), available at https://www.
innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited April 15, 2021) (to date, 375 people have
been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing).
221. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201(h)(1) (West 2018).
222. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201(h)(2) (West 2018).
223. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating that "it is critical that the
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.").
224. Exonerate the Innocence (The Innocence Project), available at https://www.
innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited April 15, 2021).
225. In addition to people who are not guilty by reason of affirmative defense.
226. Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
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convictions than exculpating wrongfully convicted individuals. New
Mexico courts have stated the importance of "ensuring accuracy in
criminal convictions in order to maintain credibility"227. Maintaining
credibility of the New Mexico court system, although of obvious importance, does not seem to require excessive limitation on access to
post-conviction DNA testing.
Some individuals may balk at the concept of reducing procedural
limitations on access to post-conviction DNA testing, fearing that
either a multitude of inmates will rush to file petitions; or that numerous convictions will be overturned. A quick look at the statistics
of exonerations, and more specifically at, exonerations due to postconviction DNA testing, should assuage any fears that additional access to testing will open such a floodgate. In the United States, only
2,679 people have been exonerated since 1989228. This indicates that
since the advent of DNA testing in 1985, it is likely that fewer people
are being wrongfully convicted based on the availability of DNA testing at trial.
For an inmate to request post-conviction DNA testing, there must
be a viable piece of evidence, containing non-degraded biological
material which has been kept by the state229. This requirement itself
limits inmates' ability to seek testing, because the evidence may no
longer be viable, or because it was lost or destroyed by the state. The
Innocence Project notes that 29% of its cases were closed due to lost or
destroyed biological evidence230.
Post-conviction DNA testing in New Mexico is not the last procedural barrier between an inmate and freedom231. It would be more
227. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 at para. 37 (quoting Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007NMSC-035, 142 N.M. 89) (cited in note 1).
228. See about DNA (The National Registry Of Exonerations), available at
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/DNA.aspx (last visited
April 15, 2021).
229. See, e.g., N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(D) (West 2019); Keith A. Findley, New
, 75 Wis. Law 20.20 (2002) (explaining that
Wisconsin's new law requires the state to preserve biological evidence for postconviction DNA testing).
230. DNA Exonerations in the United States (The Innocence Project), available at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last
visited April 15, 2021).
231. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2 (West 2019).
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appropriate to describe it as the first barrier after all appeals have been
denied. The New Mexico post-conviction DNA testing statute also
serves as the relief statute and includes instructions to the district
courts on how to address petitions for DNA testing232. Section F states
that when a district court reviews a petition for post-conviction DNA
testing, "the district court may dismiss the petition, order a response
by the district attorney, or issue an order for DNA testing"233. Through
this language, a district court may dismiss a petition outright for postconviction DNA testing if it deems the petition lacks merit. Any concern that a flood of petitions for post-conviction DNA testing would
overwhelm the judicial system , or present a substantial judicial cost,
should be reduced by the fact that the statute does not require a preliminary hearing, and in fact allows for outright dismissal of petitions
at the discretion of the district courts234.
Whenever a New Mexico district court orders post-conviction
DNA testing as a result of a petition being granted, the court is still
precluded from granting any relief to petitioners unless the results are
deemed "exculpatory"235. If the district court finds that the results are
exculpatory, it may either (1) set aside the petitioner's conviction and
sentence; (2) dismiss the charges with prejudice; (3) grant a new trial;
or (4) order other relief236. In order for a district court to determine
whether DNA results are considered exculpatory under the statute,
a multistep analysis must be conducted237. In Hobbs, the Court of
Appeals recently reviewed the interpretation as to whether a postconviction DNA test should be considered exculpatory238. It held that
DNA evidence is exculpatory when the evidence: "(1) is material; (2) is
not merely cumulative; (3) is not merely impeaching or contradictory;
and (4) raises a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not
have pled guilty or been found guilty239. [...]". This standard of proof
232. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(F) (West 2019).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019).
236. Id.
237. Hobbs, 2020 NMCA 44 (cited in note 1) (the standard announced by the
court to determine the exculpatory nature of evidence could be overruled in the pending review by NMSC).
238. Id. at para. 42.
239. Id.
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for determining whether DNA results are exculpatory, such that a
district court could grant a new trial or other relief is a high standard.
The risk of any person serving a prison sentence or being executed due to a wrongful conviction is too high to restrict access to
post-conviction DNA testing to situations where someone else may
be at fault. Because New Mexico has a high standard for granting a
petitioner's relief based on the results of post-conviction DNA testing, it is unnecessary for the state to require such a high burden for
inmates to request testing. Specifically, other states have successfully
implemented changes to their post-conviction DNA testing statutes,
removing the claim of innocence and identity requirements240. As it
currently stands, the New Mexico post-conviction DNA statute may
entirely prohibit wrongfully convicted individuals who asserted selfdefense claims at trial from petitioning for testing, based upon the
state's identity requirement. By removing the unnecessary restrictions
on access to post-conviction DNA testing, the state could more equitably grant petitions for post-conviction DNA testing241. without fear
of overturning many convictions. The New Mexico post-conviction
DNA relief statute contains enough procedural burdens to ensure
that only those inmates whose test results are exculpatory may be
granted relief242.
6. Conclusion
Individuals wrongfully convicted after asserting self-defense
claims are prohibited from seeking relief based on unnecessary statutory restrictions. States such as New Mexico, which require petitioners to claim innocence and prove that identity was an issue at trial,
prohibit individuals who may have valid claims of self-defense from
seeking justice. These statutory limitations upon petitioners who seek
post-conviction DNA testing are unnecessarily burdensome because
after a petitioner is granted DNA testing, there are further statutory
limitations before any relief is granted. The New Mexico legislature
240. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (West 2018).
241. Innocent or not guilty due to justification.
242. N M Stat Ann § 31-1A-2(I) (West 2019).
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should follow the example set by Maryland and remove these statutory restrictions on DNA testing. This would ensure that individuals
who may be wrongfully convicted are not excluded based on an assertion of self-defense.
Appendix 1(Wrongful conviction statistics)
The demographic makeup of the exonerated includes 60% African American, 31% Caucasian, 8% Latinx, 1% Asian American, and less
than 1% Native American or self-identified "Other."243 Misidentification by eyewitnesses resulted in 69% of the wrongful convictions, and
29% involved false confessions244. While the 375 wrongfully convicted
persons were sitting in jail, 154 additional violent crimes were committed by the 165 actual assailants later identified245. While free, these
assailants committed 83 sexual assaults; 36 homicides, and 35 "other
violent crimes"246. Out of the 104 people who were convicted based
on false confessions, 22% had exculpatory DNA evidence available at
trial247. In a study of 10,060 cases where DNA testing was performed
during criminal investigations by FBI labs, more than 25% of the
cases resulted in exclusion of suspects (pre-trial) based on the DNA
testing248.
Appendix 2 (States requiring assertions of innocence)
California has a similarly strict statutory requirement (to Arkansas) for post-conviction DNA testing petitions249. It requires that petitioners include motions for testing a statement that (1) petitioner is
243. See DNA Exonerations in the United States (The Innocent Project), available
at: https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last
visited April 17, 2021)
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Cal Penal Code §1405(b), (West 2015).
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not the perpetrator of the crime, and (2) an explanation detailing how
the DNA testing is relevant to the petitioner's claim of innocence250.
In a California death penalty case, the court upheld a trial court's decision to deny post-conviction DNA testing, even though the petitioner
satisfied the requirement that the DNA testing would be relevant to
the issue of identity, due to there being other categories of evidence
making it less probable that petitioner was innocent251.
The state of Delaware requires petitioners to sign affidavits, under
threat of perjury, asserting that the petitioner is actually innocent and
explain how the DNA testing requested will establish innocence252. Interestingly, the Delaware courts have interpreted the statute to require
that the DNA testing to be conducted has the scientific potential to
yield a favorable result, but that the statute does not require petitioner
to show that the test will likely produce favorable results253.
The post-conviction DNA testing statute in Florida contains strict
requirements regarding the assertions to be made by petitioners seeking DNA testing254. For example, the statute requires petitioners to
make "a statement that the movant is innocent" along with the assertion of identity being an issue at trial255. Florida courts have also applied the statute strictly, finding that denial of post-conviction DNA
testing to petitioners who alleged self-defense at trial is proper, because identity is not determined to be a disputed issue when the petitioner has testified to being physically present at the scene256.
Under the Idaho post-conviction DNA testing statute, petitioners
must present a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial, and
the trial court shall only grant testing where the results of that testing has the scientific potential of producing evidence demonstrating
that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent257.
The Idaho courts have interpreted the post-conviction DNA testing
250. Id.
251. See Richardson v. Super. Ct., 183 P3d 1199, 1206 (Cal 2008), as modified (July
16, 2008)
252. Title 11 Del Code Ann § 4504(a) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
253. See Anderson v. State, 831 A2d 858, 867 (Del 2003).
254. Fla Rule Crim Proc 3.853(B)(2)-(3) (2010).
255. Id.
256. See Scott v. State, 75 S3d 392, 392-93 (Fla App 2011).
257. Idaho Code Ann. § 19-4902(c), (e)(1) (West 2012).
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standard as requiring that the DNA testing has the scientific potential
of demonstrating a greater than 51% chance that the petitioner is in
fact innocent258.
The Illinois post-conviction DNA testing statute also requires petitioners to state a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial and
assert "actual innocence"259. However, the standard for when a court
should allow post-conviction DNA testing differs from the previously mentioned statutes because it limits the courts to approve testing to
when the testing is capable of producing relevant evidence supporting
the petitioner's claim for "actual innocence," or when the testing will
raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have been acquitted if the evidence had been available at trial260. The Illinois courts,
similar to the Florida courts, have upheld a strict interpretation of the
identity requirement for post-conviction DNA testing261. Specifically,
the Illinois Court has held that convicted individuals who pled guilty
at trial are unable to seek post-conviction DNA testing because they
are unable to claim that identity was a disputed issue at trial.
The state of Iowa has seemingly lenient statutory requirements for
petitioners to obtain post-conviction DNA testing262, but the courts,
by contrast, have held petitioners to extremely high standards when
determining whether petitioners should have access to testing263, The
Iowa court defined its "demanding actual innocence standard," as requiring petitioners who request DNA testing to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that, despite their conviction, no reasonable
fact-finder could convict the petitioner in light of the DNA test results264, The court explained that this demanding standard is required
in order to balance the liberty interests of a factually innocent petitioner to be free against the state's interest in finality, and conservation of resources265.
258. See Johnson v. State, 395 P3d 1246, 1253 (Idaho 2017).
259. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2014).
260. Id.
261. See People v. O'Connell, 879 NE2d 315, 319 (Ill 2007).
262. Iowa Code Ann § 81.10(d) (West 2019).
263. See, e.g., Dewberry v. State, 941 NW2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2019), rehearing denied (Jan.
16, 2020).
264. Id.
265. Id.
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Maine's post-conviction DNA testing statute requires petitioners to: (1) state claims of "actual innocence," (2) demonstrate that the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime was an issue at trial, and (3)
requires that the DNA evidence petitioner seeks to be tested be material to the issue of identity266. Maine courts have held that a court shall
allow post-conviction DNA testing when the testing could either exonerate the petitioner, or significantly advance the petitioner's claim
of actual innocence267.
Both Minnesota and Missouri have similar statutory requirements
for post-conviction DNA testing to Illinois and Maine268. However,
Missouri's statute requires petitioners to state a claim that the DNA
testing will yield results of the petitioner's "actual innocence"269. North
Dakota's post-conviction DNA statute likewise requires petitioners
to establish a claim of "actual innocence," and present a prima facie
case that identity was an issue at trial270.
The state of Ohio requires a more enhanced requirement than the
above described statutes, requiring petitioners to show that no reasonable juror could have convicted the petitioner if the results of the
post-conviction DNA testing had been available at trial271. The statute
defines this standard as "outcome determinative"272 and additionally
requires that identity had been an issue at trial, and that petitioner
must demonstrate that the DNA testing will exclude the petitioner as
a source273.
Oregon and Texas have similar statutory requirements for postconviction DNA testing, as both states impose a requirement that in
light of the DNA results, the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted274. The Oregon statute, besides the requirements
266. Title 15 Me Rev Stat Ann § 2137 (2019).
267. See State v. Donovan, 853 A2d 772, 776 (Me 2004).
268. Minn Stat Ann § 590.01 (West 2005) (held unconstitutional by Reynolds v.
State, 888 NW2d 125 (Minn 2016), on time limit of 2 years, has not been revised as of
Oct. 19, 2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 547.035 (West 2018).
269. Mo Ann Stat § 547.035 (West 2018)
270. ND Cent Code Ann § 29-32.1-15 (West 2019).
271. See State v. Prade, 930 NE2d 287, 291 (Ohio 2010).
272. Id.
273. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2953.74 (West 2010).
274. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 138.692 (West 2020); Tex Crim Proc Code Ann §
64.03 (West 2017).
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that petitioner claim "actual innocence" and show that identity was at
issue, also requires petitioners to demonstrate that if the DNA results
had been available at trial, (1) no prosecution would have occurred, or
(2) there would have been a more favorable outcome to the petitioner275. The Texas statutory requirements are similar to that of the Oregon statute; however, the standard specifically requires petitioners
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she would
not have been convicted if the DNA results had been obtained during
trial.276 Texas courts have interpreted this preponderance of the evidence standard to mean that there must have been a greater than 50%
chance of petitioner being acquitted if the DNA results were admitted
at the time of trial.277
Several of the states which require claims of innocence by petitioners seeking post-conviction DNA testing also include additional
rules or burdens of proof. For example, the Alabama statute, which
seems to be the most exclusionary statute278, only permits individuals
convicted of Capital offenses who are awaiting execution to file petitions279. Additionally, Alabama requires petitioners to show that the
DNA test result "on its face" would demonstrate factual innocence of
the crime280.
Two states, Florida and Colorado, require petitioners to demonstrate, in petitions for post-conviction DNA testing, that the DNA test
will produce definitive results of "actual innocence"281. The Colorado
statute defines "actual innocence" as "clear and convincing evidence
such that no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant"282.
At least six state statutes require petitioners demonstrate that if the
DNA results had been available at trial, there is a reasonable probability that no juror could have found the petitioner guilty, or that trial
275. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 138.692 (West 2020).
276. Tex Crim Proc Code Ann § 64.03 (West 2017).
277. See, e.g., Leal v. State, 303 SW3d 292, 302 (Tex Crim App 2009).
278. Based upon analysis of the 26 state statutes and the District of Columbia
which require innocence claims.
279. Ala Code § 15-18-200 (2020).
280. Id.
281. Fla Rule Crim Proc 3.853(B)(2)-(3) (2010); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-1-413(1)
(West 2003).
282. Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-1-411 (West 2003).
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would not have resulted in conviction.283 In addition, Illinois includes
a requirement that petitioners demonstrate a reasonable probability
that they would have been acquitted at trial had the evidence been
available284; Ohio includes the Outcome Determinative standard previously examined285; and Delaware requires the DNA to have the scientific potential to yield a favorable result to the petitioner286.

283. See, e.g., Or Rev Stat Ann § 138.692 (West 2020); Tex Crim Proc Code Ann
§ 64.03 (West 2017); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2953.74 (West 2010); Iowa Code Ann §
81.10(d) (West 2019); 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2014); Wis Stat § 974.07 (West 2011).
284. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2014).
285. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2953.74 (West 2010).
286. Title 11, Del Code Ann § 4504(a) (West 2000).
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